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The External Dimension of Withdrawal from the 
European Union 
 
Adam Łazowski* and Ramses A. Wessel**  
 





Departure from the European Union has political, economic and legal consequences. Almost a 
year after the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom it is absolutely clear that, first heading for the 
door, then departing from the European Union and (at the same time or thereafter) providing 
for a post-divorce framework will be neither easy nor smooth.1 This article has no desire to 
serve as a comprehensive guide to what has been unravelling ever since PM Theresa May filed 
her notification as per Article 50 TEU.2 Au contraire, it focuses on one, yet very crucial, aspect 
of Brexit: its external dimension.3 Even with the subject area narrowed down the readers will 
find in the analysis that follows that departure from the EU raises a myriad of political and legal 
issues that need to be attended to. In the simplified Brexiters’ world everything is easy: from 
the moment of withdrawal the United Kingdom will no longer be bound by EU external 
policies, including Common Commercial Policy and all existing EU agreements with third 
countries will cease to apply. In the meantime, the United Kingdom will flourish and become 
a trade power by means of trade agreements it desires to negotiate with countries around the 
World. This would be done swiftly with no tears or sweat. Alas, such a view, although appealing 
to some, does not take into account that many a times the truth is stranger than fiction. In this 
article, we aim to address some of the pertinent political and legal issues that the European 
Union and the United Kingdom must attend to as divorce negotiations will be pending. It should 
be emphasised that the latter’s centre of gravity will not be on external dimension, though – as 
argued in the next section – withdrawal process has two faces. From the point of view of the 
European Union it is, in itself, a hybrid between an internal EU affair and an external relations 
exercise. This will make matters even more complicated than prima facie they are.  
 
                                                
* Professor of EU Law, Westminster Law School, University of Westminster, London. 
** Professor of International and European Law and Governance at the University of Twente, The Netherlands. 
1 See, inter alia, A.F. Tatham, Don’t Mention Divorce at the Wedding, Darling!: EU Accession and Withdrawal 
after Lisbon, in: A. Biondi, P. Eeckhout, S. Ripley (eds), EU Law after Lisbon, Oxford 2012, p. 128; H. Hofmeister, 
Should I stay or Should I Go?- A Critical Analysis of the Right to Withdraw from the EU, 16 ELJ (2010) p. 589; 
A. Łazowski, Withdrawal from the European Union and Alternatives to Membership, 37 ELRev. (2012) p. 523; 
P. Nicolaides, Withdrawal from the European Union: A Typology of Effects, 20 MJ (2013) p. 209; C. M. Rieder, 
The Withdrawal Clause of the Lisbon Treaty in the Light of EU Citizenship: Between Disintegration and 
Integration, 37 FILJ (2013) p. 147; A. Łazowski, EU Withdrawal: Good Business for British Business?, 22 EPL 
(2016) p. 115. 
2 [date to be inserted in the proofs] 
3 On external dimension of Brexit see I. Bosse-Platière and C. Flaesch-Mougin, Brexit et action extérieure de 
l’Union européenne, Revue trimestrielle de droit européen (2016) p. 759. 
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For the purposes of this article we grouped a plethora of external aspects of Brexit into four 
different areas to study the external dimension of withdrawal from the European Union. Firstly, 
a fundamental question is what is the formal status of the United Kingdom now that it has 
triggered Article 50 TEU. It goes without saying that being a departing country the United 
Kingdom will remain a member state until the formal date of departure.4 To this end it will be 
bound by the principle of loyal co-operation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU. But, the conundrum 
that the European Union is facing now, is whether to pretend that it is business as usual and 
therefore allow the UK to be involved in the negotiation and, perhaps even, ratification of new 
international agreements between the European Union with third countries. A flip side of the 
same coin is even more interesting and challenging. Perhaps, the United Kingdom should be 
put into the exit mode and, by the same token, it should be allowed to kick start setting-up its 
own external relations regime straight away. Secondly, how and when the United Kingdom will 
be severed from the external policies of the European Union and the external relations legal 
framework. This, inter alia, triggers a question of application of EU’s unilateral instruments 
(for instance the Common Customs Tariff) and hundreds of treaties that bind the European 
Union with countries in the EU’s neighbourhood and around the globe. Apart from the 
international agreements, the UK has been part of the adoption and implementation of all 
decisions and policies in the area of external relations. The latter have evolved through the years 
and have gained in importance. There is hardly a policy area left in which the EU and its 
Member States have not engaged in relations with third states or other international institutions. 
Thirdly, the question is how and when the UK should be phased out from institutional 
diplomatic networks related to the European External Action Service, including the European 
Union Delegations around the World. More generally, there is the heritage of the UK having 
been part of the EU’s external activities for decades, not to mention that it is one of two EU 
Member States that hold a permanent seat at the UN’s Security Council. Fourthly, there is the 
post-divorce reality that needs to be taken into account. A quick scan of different “off-the-shelf” 
models proves that, with exception of general clauses, they hardly ever include provisions on 
external relations or involvement of third countries (even candidates for membership) in EU’s 
external activities. 
 
In the following sections we deal with these questions in order to allow for a conclusion on, 
what we believe to be, the key external dimensions of Brexit. Our aim is not engage in 
unnecessary scaremongering but rather to prove the point that while Brexit is perfectly possible 
from the political and legal points of view, it will be a very complex and resource thirsty 
exercise. This will be particularly the case for the United Kingdom, although the effects will be 






                                                
4 Either entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or fall down the cliff of dover in an act of unilateral 
withdrawal. Both options are extensively analysed in A. Łazowski, Withdrawal from the European Union. A Legal 
Appraisal, forthcoming in 2017. 
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2. Position of the UK in EU External Affairs before Withdrawal 
 
2.1 EU’s External Relations Regime  
 
One of the political and legal issues that have emerged following the Brexit referendum is 
whether the United Kingdom can negotiate trade agreements with third countries before it 
formally leaves the European Union. This is linked to a more general question of UK’s status 
in the European Union following its notification of intention to withdraw, but before that wish 
becomes a reality. As already alluded to, a legal orthodoxy is that until the divorce materialises 
the United Kingdom remains a fully-fledged Member State bound by both the division of 
competences and the principle of loyal co-operation (as enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU). 
However, the situation can be more nuanced than it prima facie looks. Yet, before this is studied 
in detail, it is essential to briefly revisit the foundations of EU external relations. Needless to 
say, they form an important part of the EU’s activities and over the years it has become an 
important actor in international relations.5 This did not happen overnight but rather it has 
evolved steadily through decades. The starting point has been the Common Commercial Policy 
with its legal foundations and procedural modus operandi laid down in the original EEC Treaty. 
As well known the big leap forward was the Treaty of Maastricht which provided a legal basis 
for what is now the Common Foreign and Security Policy.6 The subsequent treaty revisions, 
that is the Treaty of Amsterdam7, the Treaty of Nice8 and the Treaty of Lisbon9 strengthened 
the legal parameters of EU’s external action even further.10  
 
It is crucial to make the distinction between the political and legal aspects of EU’s external 
action. As far as the first is concerned, the European Union has very extensive competences 
stemming from the Treaty on European Union. The legal side of external relations, including 
the ability of the EU to conclude international treaties with third countries is of essence for the 
                                                
5 See, inter alia, K.E. Jorgensen, K.A. Aarstad, E. Drieskens, K. Laatikainen and B. Tonra (eds.), The SAGE 
Handbook of European Foreign Policy, London 2015. 
6 Treaty on European Union, OJ C 191/1992, p. 1. See further, inter alia, D. O’Keeffe, P. Twomey, (eds.), Legal 
Issues of the Treaty of Maastricht, London-New York-Chichester-Brisbane-Toronto-Singapore, Wiley Chancery 
Law 1994. 
7 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts, OJ 1997 C 340/1. See further, inter alia, D. O’Keeffe, P. Twomey, (eds.), 
Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty, Oxford-Portland, Oregon 1999. 
8 Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities 
and certain related acts, OJ 2001 C 80/1. See further, inter alia, M. Andenas, J. Usher (eds), The Treaty of Nice 
and Beyond Enlargement and Constitutional Reform, Oxford and Portland-Oregon 2003. 
9 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, OJ C 306/2007, p. 1. See further, inter alia, M. Trybus, L. Rubini (eds), The 
Treaty of Lisbon and the Future of European Law and Policy, Cheltenham-Northampton 2012; J-C. Piris, The 
Lisbon Treaty. A Legal and Political Analysis, Cambridge 2010; P. Craig, The Lisbon Treaty. Law, Politics, and 
Treaty Reform, Oxford 2010; A. Biondi, P. Eeckhout, S. Ripley (eds), EU Law after Lisbon, Oxford 2012. 
10 See, inter alia, P. J. Cardwell (ed), EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era, The Hague 
2011, P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law, 2nd ed., Oxford 2011, P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations 
Law, Oxford and Portland-Oregon 2015; B. Van Vooren and R.A. Wessel, EU External Relations Law: Text, 
Cases and Materials, Cambridge 2014; S. Keukeleire, T. Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, 2nd 
ed., Basingstoke 2014; I. Govaere, E. Lannon, P. van Elsuwege and S. Adam, The European Union in the World 
Essays in Honour of Marc Maresceau, Brussels 2013; P. Koutrakos (ed.), European Foreign Policy. Legal and 
Political Perspectives, Cheltenham 2011. 
 4 
main thread in this article. Anyone au courant with EU law is fully aware that part and parcel 
of the EU’s legal regime is the division of competences between the European Union and its 
Member States.11 It has both, an internal and an external dimension.12 To put it differently, the 
EU Member States have agreed to not only transfer some internal competences to legislate in 
certain areas which can be better regulated at the EU level, but they have equally tasked the EU 
to handle a plethora of issues in relations with third countries.13 The logic of the internal-
external connection is well-known: once the Member States have transferred competences to 
the EU in their internal relations, they have become far less interesting partners at the 
international level since they are simply no longer in the position to negotiate and conclude 
international agreements on issues legislated internally at EU level. It is true that the exclusive 
competences (competences on the basis of which the EU can conclude international agreements 
without the Member States themselves being the parties) are not universal, but it is equally true 
that there are not so many areas left in which the EU members can engage in international 
commitments while completely bypassing the EU.14 In case of many dossiers the competences 
are shared and thus agreements are concluded by the European Union and its Member States, 
on the one side, and third countries, on the other side.  
 
As already alluded to earlier, the EU has become a global actor and has become active in most 
of key global issues, ranging from trade and investment to development and environment. 
International agreements concluded by the European Union cover many areas either grouped 
under more general association or co-operation agreements or are provided for in sectoral 
                                                
11 More on the attributed powers and division of competences see, inter alia, G. Davies, The post-Laeken division 
of competences, 28 ELRev (2003) pp. 686-698; M. Dougan, The Convention’s draft Constitutional Treaty: 
bringing Europe closer to its lawyers?, 28 ELRev (2003) pp. 763-793; P. Craig, Competence: clarity, conferral, 
containment and consideration, 29 ELRev (2004) pp. 323-344; T. Tridimas, Competence after Lisbon. The elusive 
search for bright lines, in D. Ashiagbor, N. Countouris, I. Lianos (eds), The European Union after the Treaty of 
Lisbon, Cambridge 2012, pp. 50-51, M. Dougan, The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds not Hearts, 45 
CMLRev. (2008) pp. 617-703; M. Claes, B. de Witte, Competences: Codification and Contestation, in: A. 
Łazowski, S. Blockmans (eds), Research Handbook on EU Institutional Law, Cheltenham 2016, pp. 46-87. 
12 See for a very good recent overview: F. Erlbacher, ‘Recent Case Law on External Competences of the European 
Union: How Member States Can Embrace their Own Treaty’, CLEER Papers, 2017/2; 
http://www.asser.nl/cleer/publications/cleer-papers/cleer-paper-20172-erlbacher/; and, more extensively: B. Van 
Vooren and R.A. Wessel, EU External Relations Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014, Chapters 3-5. 
13 It is notable that the Court of Justice already in the 1970s defined the inextricable link between domestic and 
external competences in ground-breaking judgment in case 22/70 Commission of the European Communities v. 
Council of the European Communities (ERTA), ECLI:EU:C:1971:32. For a commentary, also in relation to 
subsequent jurisprudence, see P. Mengozzi, The EX External Competences: from the ERTA Case to the Opinion 
in Lugano Convention, in M. Maduro, L. Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future of EU Law. The Classics of EU Law 
Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty, Oxford and Portland-Oregon 2010, pp. 213-217; P. 
Eeckhout, Bold Constitutionalism and Beyond, in M. Maduro, L. Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future of EU Law. 
The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty, Oxford and Portland-Oregon 2010, 
pp. 218-223; Ch. Hillion, ERTA, ECHR and Open Skies: Laying the Grounds of the EU System of External 
Relations, in M. Maduro, L. Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future of EU Law. The Classics of EU Law Revisited on 
the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty, Oxford and Portland-Oregon 2010, pp. 224-233; R. Post, Constructing 
the European Polity: ERTA and the Open Skies Judgments, in M. Maduro, L. Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future 
of EU Law. The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty, Oxford and Portland-
Oregon 2010, pp. 234-247. 
14 For an overview of the areas where the EU remains active, see, inter alia, S. Keukeleire, T. Delreux, The Foreign 
Policy of the European Union, 2nd ed., Basingstoke 2014.  
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treaties with third countries.15 In early 2017 the EU’s treaty database listed over 1100 
international agreements concluded by the EU and/or Euratom with countries around the World. 
This has many consequences. One of them is that to a large extent the Member States rely on 
the EU and the expertise of the European Commission to negotiate and conclude international 
agreements. This is particularly the case in ‘exclusive’ policy areas such as trade or fisheries, 
in which the role of the Member States has been marginalised. Thus, while individual EU 
members are still full members of the WTO, most of the actual work is done by the European 
Commission. A side effect of this shift is that over the years the EU members have lost 
considerable expertise in international trade law and have not concluded any trade agreements 
in their own right. This is the reality that the United Kingdom has woken up to in the aftermath 
of the Brexit referendum. Not only the civil servants have to deal with gargantuan tasks that the 
withdrawal has brought but also there are shortages of expertise forcing the Whitehall to hire 
additional personnel and, perhaps, to outsource some of the tasks. 
  
2.2 ‘You Can Go Your Own Way’? 
 
In implementation of Article 50 TEU the United Kingdom notified in March 2017 its intention 
to withdraw from the European Union. This set things in motion, at least in a formal sense. In 
fact, a lot of preparatory work has been done on both sides of the English Channel since the 
referendum in June 2016. While Article 50 TEU governs the modus operandi for withdrawal, 
no attention is being given to the external effects of the exit from the EU. Accordingly, it will 
largely remain on the margins of Brexit negotiations. But, as mentioned in the opening section 
of this article, the key question is to what extent the UK can already anticipate its future role as 
a non-EU country. 16  
 
Internally, the position after the notification is clear. The UK remains an EU Member, even 
though on many occasions it may be a little awkward, to say the least. Bearing this prospect in 
mind the United Kingdom rescinded its presidency in the European Union which was scheduled 
for 2017. One thing is certain, though. At least during the Brexit negotiations the United 
Kingdom is at the other side of the table. Article 50(4) TEU provides that a withdrawing country 
does not participate in discussions in the European Council or Council or in decisions 
concerning it. By the same token, the voting rules are accordingly adapted. The Commission, 
                                                
15 In many cases a general framework treaty is supplemented by sectoral agreements of sorts. For instance, EU-
Georgia relations are covered by the Association Agreement (Association Agreement between the European Union 
and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other 
part, OJ L 261/2014, p. 4). Furthermore, a list of sectoral agreements concluded between the parties includes, inter 
alia, Agreement between the European Union and Georgia establishing a framework for the participation of 
Georgia in European Union crisis management operations, OJ L 14/2014, p. 2; Agreement between the European 
Union and Georgia on protection of geographical indications of agricultural products and foodstuff, OJ L 93/2012, 
p. 3; Common Aviation Area Agreement between the European Union and its Member States and Georgia, OJ L 
321/2012, p. 3; Agreement between the European Union and Georgia on the readmission of persons residing 
without authorization, OJ L 52/2011, p. 47; Agreement between the European Union and Georgia on the 
facilitation of the issuance of visas, OJ L 52/2011, p. 34. 
16 See also R.A. Wessel, You Can Check Out Any Time You Like, But Can You Really Leave? On ‘Brexit’ and 
Leaving International Organizations, 13 IOLR (2016) pp. 197-209. Parts of the present contribution are based on 
that short Editorial. Many thanks to Christophe Hillion for the valuable discussions we had with him on the points 
in this section. The usual disclaimer applies. 
 6 
the European Parliament, the Court or other EU institutions are not mentioned, apart from the 
fact that the European Parliament (including the UK members) will be asked to approve the 
withdrawal agreement and the Commission is involved in the negotiations (formally not 
without the commissioner from the UK, Sir Julian King and his cabinet, but informally he will 
most probably not participate in the deliberations).  
 
Externally, the situation is indeed largely left open. The British international trade secretary, 
Liam Fox, is reported to have said that the UK is “discussing the possible shape of new 
agreements” with at least 12 countries, adding that dozens more were prepared to expand their 
UK trading links.17 Given the fact that the UK will remain empty-handed when it does not 
replace the trade relations it has with third states on the basis of its EU membership with new 
agreements, the question has indeed come up whether the UK can already start negotiating, and 
perhaps concluding agreements, with other states prior to exit day. Such a proposition is 
problematic in several ways that are explored further below. 
 
First, there is Article 50(3) TEU, which is seemingly quite clear (although phrased a contrario) 
on the fact that the Treaties remain in force for a withdrawing country until the day of actual 
exit from the European Union. The provision in question does not, however, take into account 
that a member state will be leaving the European Union at least in two stages. One needs to 
distinguish the period from the notification to signature of the withdrawal agreement and the 
final phase of its approval/ratification. Should the withdrawal agreement take the shape of 
mixed agreement the latter phase would not be short by any stretch of imagination. Bearing in 
mind the breadth of withdrawal process one of the present authors argued in an earlier 
publication that the European Union should develop a special status of a withdrawing country 
waiving some of the obligations linked to membership to allow it to prepare for the inevitable 
legal consequences of exit.18 Setting the legal parameters aside, it would make perfect sense to 
allow the United Kingdom to proceed with negotiations of trade agreements with third countries 
from the date of notification, providing that none of the deals would enter into force before 
actual Brexit. This, of course, is easier said than done and it would create numerous conundrums 
that would have to be solved well in advance. For instance, if the United Kingdom were to 
proceed in such exit mode would it be involved in pending negotiations and ratification of 
agreements with third countries? Would it keep its veto rights? However, unless any special 
deal is arranged with the United Kingdom the situation – at least from the legal point of view – 
looks as follows.  
 
To begin with, nothing changes in the division of competences between the United Kingdom 
and the European Union. The latter holds exclusive competences in number of areas falling 
under the external relations. It is worth referring here to Article 2(1) TFEU, which provides that 
“When the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive competence in a specific area, only the Union 
may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so themselves 
only if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts.” This provision 
                                                
17 ‘Pursuing trade pacts outside EU “could mean worse Brexit deal for UK”’, The Guardian, 25 January 2017; 
https://cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/amp.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/25/brexit-deal-uk-eu-trade-pacts 
18 A. Łazowski, Withdrawal from the European Union and Alternatives to Membership, 37 ELRev. (2012) p. 523. 
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continues to apply and implies that the UK will have to respect the division of competences and 
is refrained from adopting legally binding acts in area of EU exclusive competence. Bearing in 
mind the external dimension of Brexit it seems that the most crucial is the fact that broadly 
defined Common Commercial Policy is one of the policy areas where EU competences are 
exclusive.19 The same goes for the Customs Union. The result of all of this is that the UK simply 
does not have the competence to conclude international agreements in the area of Common 
Commercial Policy, or indeed in any other area of exclusive EU competence, until it formally 
leaves the European Union. The international agreements that have so far been concluded by 
the EU remain binding on the UK until the divorce will do the parties apart. More generally, 
apart from exclusivity on the basis of the Treaties (so-called ‘a priori exclusivity’ or ‘policy 
area exclusivity’), exclusivity may flow from the adoption of internal Union measures and the 
UK would be excluded from adopting rules which affect those measures (‘conditional 
exclusivity’ or ‘pre-emption’). Finally, exclusive competences can occur when absolutely 
indispensable to achieve EU Treaty objectives, without there being internal EU measures 
(‘exclusivity through necessity’).20 All these situations would continue to deprive the UK from 
having a competence to conclude international agreements. 
 
Furthermore, also in areas of shared competences the UK continues to be limited by the rules 
and principles guiding the division of competences. Again, it is helpful to make a distinction 
between different types of competences. In the case of so-called pre-emptive competences, the 
Member State action is only excluded if the competence is exercised by the Union. In the case 
of non-pre-emptive competences the EU can fully deploy a policy, but exercising its 
competence does not exclude Member State action in the same field. In the realm of external 
relations good examples include development cooperation and humanitarian aid. A special 
shared (or in fact ‘parallel’) competence exist in relation to the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP). 
 
During the period leading up to the withdrawal the United Kingdom remains bound by two key 
principles underpinning the EU legal order, that is the principle of loyal co-operation and the 
principle of primacy. It is important to underline that even in cases in which Member States do 
have some room for external manoeuvre, the principle of sincere cooperation will have to guide 
their behaviour. On the basis of this principle “the Union and the member States shall, in full 
mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. […] The 
Member States shall […] refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of 
the Union’s objectives.” (Article 4(3) TEU). The effects of this principle are well documented 
in the academic literature and it may become particularly relevant in cases in which we are not 
                                                
19 In accordance with Article 207 TFEU this policy extends to conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating 
to trade in goods and services, commercial aspects of intellectual property rights, foreign direct investment, 
achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade. See further, 
inter alia, P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law, 2nd ed., Oxford 2011 pp. 439-466. 
20 B. Van Vooren and R.A. Wessel, EU External Relations Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Cambridge 2014, pp. 
100-102.  
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dealing with the pre-emption.21 The case-law of the Court is quite clear on, for instance, the 
scope of the principle of sincere cooperation22 but one should remember that this principle 
works both ways. On the one hand, it can be relied on by the European Union to stop the United 
Kingdom from engaging into negotiations of trade agreements with third countries. On the other 
hand, the same principle may be invoked by the UK arguing that since it is leaving the Union, 
there should be a fair degree of leverage and cooperation granted by the European Union, 
allowing it to prepare for a new future. We were confronted with a somewhat similar situation 
in case C-45/07 Commission v. Greece (IMO).23 Whereas Greece had violated its duty of 
abstention stemming from the pre-emption doctrine, that Member State argued that the 
Commission had itself failed in its duty to cooperate loyally with the Member States by not 
allowing discussion of Greece’s proposal in the so-called Marsec committee, a preparatory 
body within the Union. It thus invoked the failure of the Commission to fulfil its legal obligation 
with regard to the scope of Union law, as defence against its own failure with regard to Union 
competence. The Court’s reply was by no means surprising.24 The judges at Kirchberg held that 
a breach by the Commission of the duty of cooperation does not entitle a Member State to 
undertake actions which affect rules adopted at Union level. Nonetheless, the Court did take 
the opportunity to emphasize the reciprocal nature of the duty of cooperation. When the Union 
has an exclusive power, it too, has to cooperate loyally with its Member States.  
 
In Opinion 1/03 the Court of Justice already stated the following rationale for pre-empting 
Member State action: “[…] it is essential to ensure a uniform and consistent application of the 
Community rules and the proper functioning of the system which they establish in order to 
preserve the full effectiveness of Community law”.25 The purpose of excluding Member States 
from acting solely has thus been to ensure effective application of EU rule through uniformity 
where the EU has exercised its shared powers conferred upon it, or where it possesses an a 
priori exclusive power.26 Indeed, the duty of cooperation and the principle of pre-emption are 
connected: pre-emption ensures application of EU rules through uniformity, whereas the duty 
                                                
21 See for instance E. Neframi, The Duty of Loyalty: Rethinking its Scope through its Application in the Field of 
EU External Relations, 47 CMLRev. (2010), pp. 323-359. B. Van Vooren and R.A. Wessel, EU External Relations 
Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Cambridge 2014, Chapter 6. 
22 One of the leading judgments was rendered in case C246/07, European Commission v Kingdom of Sweden, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:203. For an academic appraisal see, inter alia, M. Cremona, Case C-246/07, Commission v. 
Sweden (PFOS), Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 20 April 2010, 48 CMLRev. (2011) 
pp.1639-1665; J. Van Zeben, The Principle of Unity under Article 10 EC and the International Representation of 
the Union and its Member States - Case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden, 1 European Journal of Risk Regulation 
(2010) pp.301-305. More on the (im)possibilities of Member States to be active externally in areas coverd by EU 
law see, inter alia, A. Delgado Casteleiro and J. Larik, The Duty to Remain Silent: Limitless Loyalty in EU External 
Relations?, 4 ELRev. (2011) pp. 524-541.  
23 Case C-45/07 Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic, ECLI:EU:C:2009:81. 
24 Par. 26. 
25 Opinion 1/03 of the Court (Full Court) of 7 February 2006. Competence of the Community to conclude the new 
Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, ECLI:EU:C:2006:81. For an academic appraisal see, inter alia, N. Lavranos, Opinion 1/03, Lugano 
Convention, 43 (2006) CMLRev. pp. 1087-1100; Th. Kruger, Opinion 1/03. Competence of the Community to 
Conclude the New Lugano Convention on the Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, 13 CJEL (2006) pp.189-199. 
26 Case C-433/03, Commission v. Germany, Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of 
Germany, ECLI:EU:C:2005:462; Case C-266/03 Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of 
Luxemburg, ECLI:EU:C:2005:341. 
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of cooperation seeks to facilitate effectively attaining EU tasks and coherent EU international 
action. Phrased otherwise: when EU competences could be affected, the Member States are 
excluded from acting at all. Yet, when the EU treaty objectives are at stake and there is some 
room for manoeuver, this triggers an obligation of the Member States and the Union institutions 
to cooperate loyally.27 Translated to the obligations of the UK in the period between the 
notification and exit day, one could argue that there would be some room for the EU and the 
UK to jointly seek for possibilities to allow the UK to explore options for future trade deals 
with third countries as long as EU competences would not be affected. At the same time, it is 
clear, that, firstly, the division of competences, and secondly, the duty of sincere cooperation 
would entail that any unilateral uncoordinated actions on the side of the UK run the risk of 
being in violation of EU law. 
 
The second doctrine that the United Kingdom will remain to be bound by until the date of 
departure from the European Union is the primacy. It is well established in the jurisprudence 
of the Court of Justice28 and it was recently confirmed quite expressly by the UK’s Supreme 
Court in the Miller case.29 It held that “Following the coming into force of the 1972 Act 
[European Communities Act] the normal rule is that the domestic legislation must be consistent 
with EU law. In such cases, EU law has primacy as a matter of domestic law […]”.30 This 
primacy has traditionally not been different for internal or external activities. So, even after the 
notification, the UK will have to act upon the agreed rules and principles of EU external 
relations law. This will seriously hamper the UK in preparing itself for the post-Brexit period 
as we would be dealing with negotiations on topics that are already covered by existing EU 
agreements that fall, moreover, largely under the EU’s exclusive competences. Hence, in most 
cases the UK will simply be pre-empted to negotiate (let alone to conclude) an international 
agreement and it will not be able to win any time by already starting the negotiations during the 
24 (or mostly likely 1831) months of negotiations with the EU. Indeed, checking out does not 
imply that the UK is immediately free to go its own way.32  
                                                
27 See more extensively: B. Van Vooren and R.A. Wessel, EU External Relations Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 
Cambridge 2014, Chapter 5; as well as E. Neframi, The Duty of Loyalty: Rethinking its Scope through its 
Application in the Field of EU External Relations, 47 CMLRev. (2010), pp. 323-359. 
28 See further M. Claes, The Primacy of EU Law in European and National Law, in A. Arnull, D. Chalmers (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law, Oxford 2015, pp. 178-211; B. de Witte, Direct Effect, Primacy, 
and the Nature of the Legal Order, in P. Craig, G. de Búrca, The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd ed., Oxford 2011, pp. 
323-362; A. Capik, Five Decades since Van Gend en Loos and Costa came to town: primacy, direct and indirect 
effect revisited, in A. Łazowski, S. Blockmans (eds), Research Handbook on EU Institutional Law, Cheltenham 
2016, pp. 379-420. 
29 R (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5. 
30 Para. 67. See https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2016-0196-judgment.pdf. See also Oliver Garner, 
‘“So Long (As) and Farewell?” The United Kingdom Supreme Court in Miller’, European Law Blog, 26 January 
2017; http://europeanlawblog.eu/2017/01/26/so-long-as-and-farewell-the-united-kingdom-supreme-court-in-
miller/#more-3529 
31 As indicated by EU-negotiator Barnier; ‘UK will have less than 18 months to reach deal, says EU Brexit broker’, 
The Guardian, 6 December 2016; https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/dec/06/uk-will-have-under-18-
months-to-negotiate-deal-says-eus-brexit-broker 
32 Cf. the remarks by HR Federica Mogherini during her visit to the USA: “[…] 8 months after the referendum in 
the UK we have not even been notified about the beginning of negotiations, so UK will stay a Member State of 
the European Union for another two years at least. This also implies that it will not be able to negotiate any trade 
agreement bilaterally with any third country which is the case of all the Member States, not because we limit our 
Member States but because this is the guarantee for all Europeans that we are stronger in trade negotiations, being 
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Could this help us in answering the question of whether informal talks between the UK and one 
or more third states would be allowed prior to the entry into force of the withdrawal agreement? 
As we have seen, most cases can easily be settled on the basis of the division of competences 
and the primacy of EU law. Yet, are informal talks on possible new agreements to be seen as 
an exercise of an external competence by the UK? Brexit Minister Davis even argued that there 
is a difference between the negotiations (which would be allowed) and the actual signing of an 
agreement (for which a competence could not exist).33 But is it so? The answer depends on the 
meaning of the term “negotiations” and for solutions one can search in EU law as well as in 
public international law.  
 
In law of the treaties, negotiations are defined as the first phase of a treaty-making process.34 
Negotiations are generally carried out, or at least initiated, by the executive (that is to say, the 
Head of State or a minister for foreign affairs). As recently argued by de Oliveira Mazzuoli: 
“Negotiations of a treaty start when the representatives of States meet at a specific place and at 
arranged time, for the purpose of studying the possibilities to reach an agreement in connection 
with the conclusion of a specific international instrument in a joint manner.”35 The term 
‘negotiations’ can be seen to include “every action prior to an agreement of any nature, the time 
of discussion and the concurrence of wills which will or will not be transformed into a legal 
act”.36 This implies that any action by the executive which is aimed to investigate the 
possibilities to reach an international agreement could already be regarded as falling under the 
umbrella term ‘negotiations’. Admittedly, the descriptions do seem to include a certain 
formalised procedure, which would exclude fully informal talks preceding actual negotiations, 
but it is equally clear that formal talks between governmental representatives of the UK and 
third states with the aim of discussing the terms of a new agreement would easily amount to a 
‘negotiations’.  
 
When it comes to EU law one has to note that the Court of Justice was occasionally confronted 
with similar questions. In case C-433/03 Commission v. Germany (Inland Waterway), the Court 
stated that the adoption of a decision authorising the Commission to negotiate a multilateral 
agreement marks the start of a concerted action triggering the duty of cooperation.37 In case 
C246/07 European Commission v Kingdom of Sweden (PFOS), the judges at Kirchberg held 
that the duty of cooperation was triggered at an earlier stage.38 However, as mentioned before, 
                                                
the second economy in the world, and because this guarantee is that the benefit of any trade agreement goes equally 
to all Europeans without any internal competition so it is a form of guarantee for all Europeans and it is not a 
limitation.”, Washington, 9 February 2017; https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage/20408/remarks-high-representative-mogherini-press-roundtable-during-visit-united-states-america_en 
33 Speech by David Davies, 2 February 2016; http://parliamentlive.tv/event/index/bfe52708-fed8-4028-b2b8-
aa8831d173cd?in=12:37:34 
34 Cf. V. de Oliveira Mazzuoli, The Law of Treaties: A Comprehensive Study of the 1969 Vienna Convention and 
Beyond, Rio de Janiero: Forense, 2016, at 89. 
35 Ibid, at 89. 
36 Ibid, at 89. 
37 Case C-433/03 Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany, 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:462.  
38 Case C-246/07 European Commission v Kingdom of Sweden, ECLI:EU:C:2010:203. 
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in the case of Brexit the question of whether the European Commission has already utilised its 
competence is less relevant as in most cases we are dealing with existing EU agreements with 
third countries. Thus, unless as special status is given to it, the UK would simply not have the 
competence to negotiate new agreements with third countries. 
 
From a more practical perspective the question emerges what were to happen if the UK were 
to violate EU external relations law before it formally departs from the European Union. This 
would have obviously had legal and political implications. As far as the first are concerned the 
European Commission could have recourse to its usual armoury of infringement proceedings 
based on Articles 258 and 260 TFEU. The Court, in turn, could use the fast track procedure in 
order to render a judgment before the Brexit actually takes place. In purely political terms any 
violation of EU law during the negotiations would amount to political vandalism and, most 
likely would backfire and not help the UK’s position. Consequentially, it could be potentially 
detrimental to the result it aims to achieve. No doubt, that would bring a reputational damage 
to the United Kingdom. 
 
This brings us back to the point made earlier in this section of the chapter. The extraordinary 
predicament that the European Union and the United Kingdom find themselves in may call for 
extraordinary measures. One of the options is to consider granting a special status to the United 
Kingdom now that it has filed its application for withdrawal. A related question is to what extent 
third countries are already willing to open negotiations on future relationships with the UK. In 
case a special EU arrangement for the UK after the notification is not on the table, from a treaty 
law perspective third states could indeed question the competence of the UK to conclude certain 
international agreements. At the same time they also may wish to open, for instance, new tariff 
negotiations to secure or renew access to the UK market. 
 




EU external relations regime comprises many sources, which in general terms, may be divided 
into autonomous EU instruments and bilateral/multilateral treaties with third countries and 
international organisations. Withdrawal from the European Union will have profound 
consequences in relation to both categories of legal acts. Furthermore, the European Union 
operates in external relations in accordance with several policies, some of which have legal 
foundations in the Treaties39 and some were designed in practice of the EU Institutions.40 All 





                                                
39 For instance the already discussed Common Commercial Policy. 
40 European Neighbourhood Policy is a prime example.  
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3.2. Brexit and Autonomous EU instruments 
 
The catalogue of EU autonomous instruments is extensive and comprises many directly 
applicable regulations. This includes, inter alia, Regulation 952/2013 on Union Customs 
Code41, Regulation 978/2012 on generalised tariff preferences42 or Regulation 2016/1036 on 
antidumping procedure.43 They all fall under the chapeau of EU Customs Law.44 In relation to 
those legal acts Brexit will have consequences for both the European Union and the United 
Kingdom. In the European Union they will cease to apply to the UK as of the date of departure. 
One should not exclude, however, some technical adjustments to existing secondary legislation 
(just like in the case of subsequent EU enlargements). After all, as things stood when this article 
went to print, the United Kingdom was on course to leave the customs union altogether. 
Furthermore, an intertemporal provision delimiting the scope of application of relevant legal 
acts to the United Kingdom should be included in the withdrawal agreement. With no practice 
in this respect one may rely mutatis mutandis on similar clauses traditionally included in 
accession treaties.45 Obviously, such a clause would have general application, that is it won’t 
be tailor-made only for external relations acquis.  
 
Changes brought by Brexit in this domain will be way more demanding for the United Kingdom 
and its state apparatus. EU law is applicable in the United Kingdom legal orders qua European 
Communities Act 1972.46 In the wake of the Brexit referendum the British Government has 
already announced that it will be repealed and the fate of EU acquis applicable in the UK will 
be decided accordingly. As phrased by Brexit-Minister David Davis: 47 
 
“It’s very simple. At the moment we leave, Britain must be back in control. And that means EU law 
must cease to apply. […] To ensure continuity, we will take a simple approach. EU law will be 
transposed into domestic law, wherever practical, on exit day.”  
 
As confirmed by the White Paper on EU Withdrawal published in February 2017, a new act 
will thus transfer ‘useful’ EU law to UK law.48 What is simple for the Brexit-Minister will not 
be simple for those who will be implementing decisions taken by the political top. To de-EU 
the UK legal orders will be a gargantuan exercise that cannot be done with supersonic speed.49 
                                                
41 Regulation 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union 
Customs Code, OJ L 269/2013, p.1.  
42 Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a 
scheme of generalised tariff preferences, OJ L 303/2012, p. 1. 
43 Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against 
dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union, OJ 176/2016, p. 21. 
44 See, inter alia, M. Fabio, Customs Law of the European Union, 4th ed., Dordrecht 2012. 
45 S. Kaleda, Intertemporal Legal Issues in the European Union Case Law Relating to the 2004 and 2007 
Accessions, in A. Łazowski (ed), The Application of EU Law in the New Member States, The Hague 2010, pp. 99-
125. 
46 For an excellent analysis of its genesis see D. Nicol, EC Membership and the Judicialization of British Politics, 
Oxford 2001, pp. 76-116. 
47 ‘Government announces end of European Communities Act’, 2 October 2016; 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-announces-end-of-european-communities-act 
48 The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union, London 2017. 
49 See A. Łazowski, EU Withdrawal: Good Business for British Business?, 22 EPL (2016) p. 115. 
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Au contraire, this exercise will be resource thirsty and will require a lot of diligence. Alas, it 
may be in short supply bearing in mind the galloping pace of Brexit requested by the British 
Prime Minister. The complexity of the task is particularly visible in the realm of external 
relations. The United Kingdom will have to in a very short period of time adopt its own customs 
code, develop a customs tariff and adopt trade protection legislation. In order to turn the new 
legislation into reality it will have to create new authorities, boost considerably the human 
resources as its customs authorities and prepare for this its business community that is very 
much used to free trade with the rest of Europe.  
 
3.3. From Member State to Third Country: (re)negotiation of New Agreements 
 
Leaving the EU implies that the international legal position of the UK will have to be reset and 
certain dimensions of its statehood will have to be reactivated. It will no longer be able to rely 
on the EU’s expertise in international trade (including the WTO) and it will have to seriously 
upgrade its own delegations in international organisations, in which it was mainly active as an 
EU member.50 In other words, in many situations it will have to face the reality of a major shift, 
that is the transition from an EU to non-EU Member State. This, inter alia, entails that the UK 
may have to negotiate a large number of international agreements to replace the dozens, which 
– because of the division of competences – were so called ‘EU only’ agreements to which the 
Member States were not a party in their own right. As these agreements usually apply to the 
territories in which the Treaty on European Union is applied. Hence, unless some kind of 
transitional regime discussed later in this article is agreed to, the UK will no longer be covered. 
Article 216(2) of the TFEU makes it clear, however, that international agreements concluded 
by the EU are (arguably only) “binding upon the institutions of the Union and its Member 
States”. In the EU context it is internal matter as the Member States are bound by such 
agreements by means of EU law. However, with Brexit it is likely become an international law 
issue as the UK will no longer fall under the EU internal arrangements.  
 
One could perhaps argue that the EU merely concluded the agreements ‘on behalf of’ its 
Member States and that the UK would thus remain bound once the competences are returned 
to it. Yet, there are some serious flaws in this argument. Firstly, the text of the agreements does 
not indicate the UK (or any other Member States) as a contracting party. In many cases we are 
dealing with bilateral agreements and it would be difficult to simply read ‘the European Union’ 
as ‘the United Kingdom’ in those cases. Secondly, given the EU’s separate international legal 
status and its autonomous position as a global actor, it is difficult to hold on to the idea that the 
EU acted on behalf of its Member States. The Treaty on European Union clearly presents the 
EU as a separate international actor and over the years it has been accepted as such (and 
alongside its Member States) by almost all countries in the world. In other words, the UK will 
have to start from scratch, although it may in some cases aim to what could largely be a copy 
of the agreements that were concluded by the EU. This, of course, assumes that the other 
contracting parties would agree to such a solution. In fact, this should not be taken as fait 
                                                
50 See Ch. Kaddous (Ed.), The European Union in International Organisations and Global Governance: Recent 
Developments, Oxford 2015. See also I. Bosse-Platière and C. Flaesch-Mougin, Brexit et action extérieure de 
l’Union européenne, Revue trimestrielle de droit européen (2016) p. 759. 
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accompli. One thing is to negotiate a trade agreement with the biggest trade block in the World, 
quite another to negotiate it with a medium size country on the fringes of Europe. To put it 
differently, the third countries that the European Union has free trade agreements with may not 
be as accommodating to the wishes of the United Kingdom as the latter’s political circles may 
assume or hope for. Furthermore, in some cases copy-pasting existing agreements to make them 
adjusted just for the United Kingdom would make little sense, especially if such treaties require 
approximation of domestic law with EU acquis or have provisions that may only apply if one 
side is the EU (alone or together with its Member States).51  
 
In the case of so-called ‘mixed agreements’ (concluded by both the EU and its Member States 
and one or more third States or international organizations) the situation could be easier as the 
UK is bound by them as a Member State directly under public international law.52 Yet, it will 
not be easy to simply remove the UK from the list of contracting parties, because such 
international agreements - as an ‘integral part of EU law’ in the words of the EU Court - are 
closely connected with other EU legislation and policies. Moreover, many mixed agreements 
are concluded without a strict indication of what falls under EU competences and what is still 
in the hands of the Member States53, although the Council Decision may provide some hints by 
listing issues that can already be applied provisionally, that is, awaiting Member State 
ratifications.54 In any case, if the UK wishes to maintain the same legal rights and obligations 
it would have to take it as a starting point for negotiations with respective third countries. 
 
Needless to say that these negotiations will be time consuming, not only for the UK but also 
for all third parties. This, as already mentioned, will materialize provided that they will accept 
requests for negotiations in each and every case. In the case of EU-only agreements not so much 
needs to be changed after Brexit. Most likely the third countries will need to be notified of the 
fact that their respective agreements will no longer apply to a former part of the ‘EU’s territory’. 
Indeed, the ‘territorial scope’ of international agreements concluded by the EU is not without 
meaning. In the case of trade or investment agreements, for instance, a shrinking territory may 
be particularly worrisome for a third party (if only because in the case of Brexit it loses 64 
million consumers). In addition, with regard to multilateral agreements in particular, other 
aspects, including budgetary reallocations, could become part of the deal.55 
                                                
51 See, for instance, Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, 
and Ukraine, of the other part, OJ L 161/2014, p. 3. For an academic appraisal see, inter alia, G. Van der Loo, The 
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. A New Legal Instrument for 
EU Integration Without Membership, Brussels 2016, M. Emerson and V. Movchan (eds), Deepening EU-
Ukrainian Relations: What, why and how?, Brussels 2016. 
52 See, inter alia, Ch. Hillion, P. Koutrakos (eds), Mixed Agreements Revisited. The EU and its Member States in 
the World, Oxford and Portland-Oregon, 2010.  
53 See pending case 2/15 regarding the allocation of competences in Free Trade Agreement between the European 
Union and Singapore. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, ECLI:EU:C:2016:992. 
54 See, for instance, Council Decision (EU) 2017/38 of 28 October 2016 on the provisional application of the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European 
Union and its Member States, of the other part, OJ L 11/2017, p. 1080. 
55 In the reverse situation, when a new state joins the EU, the effects for third countries are determined in the 
accession treaties. See, for instance, Article 6 of the Accession Treaty with Croatia (Treaty between the Kingdom 
of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Republic of Estonia, Ireland, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, 
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With regard to mixed agreements, different considerations apply to bilateral and multilateral 
agreements.56 In the case of bilateral agreements (between the EU/Member States and a third 
party), the UK would cease to be a party, which could be given effect to by way of a notification 
to third parties. In the case of multilateral agreements, the UK could perhaps remain a party, 
although a notification regarding the changed situation would be required and an adjustment of 
some of the commitments would be necessary. Indeed, it should not be excluded that the UK’s 
continued participation may in some cases become subject to negotiations between the EU, its 
Member States and third countries (including the UK in a new special position). This may result 
in solutions on the basis of, for instance, additional Protocols or by replacing the UK’s 
participation in a multilateral mixed agreement by a ‘UK only’ agreement. For this reason, the 
withdrawal agreement may perhaps include some provisions on how to proceed in these 
situations, including the need for notifications and other arrangements. As elaborated on in 
section 4 of this article, a transition period, allowing the UK to remain covered by certain 
international agreements for a certain period after Brexit, could also be envisaged. 
 
3.2 Phasing-Out of the External Relations Institutional and Policy Frameworks 
 
As of the day of withdrawal, the UK will no longer be an EU Member State and will no longer 
have a seat in any of the EU institutions and other bodies. As a third state it will most probably 
open a diplomatic mission in Brussels and send the letters of credence of a Heads of Mission to 
the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission.57 For all 
practical purposes it may of course choose to turn the current UK Permanent Representation to 
the EU into a revamped diplomatic mission. 
 
While, indeed, on exit day all persons that have been representatives of the UK will have to 
leave their offices, this may be less easy than it sounds. Limiting ourselves to the external 
relations framework, the European External Action Service and the European Union 
Delegations around the world deserve attention.58 Apart from advisors, the EEAS staff does not 
include third country nationals. This implies that all UK personnel will have to be replaced. It 
is difficult to see that happening in one day. It has been held that the importance of ensuring 
                                                
the Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy 
of Luxembourg, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic 
of Austria, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak 
Republic, the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland (Member States of the European Union) and the Republic of Croatia concerning the accession of the 
Republic of Croatia to the European Union, OJ L112/2012, p. 10. See further, inter alia, A. Łazowski, EU do not 
worry, Croatia is behind you: A Commentary on the Seventh Accession Treaty, 8 CYELP (2012) pp. 1-30, at pp. 
32-33. 
56 See more extensively G. Van der Loo and R.A. Wessel, The Non-Ratification of Mixed Agreements: Legal 
Consequences and Solutions, 54 CMLRev. (2017) (forthcoming). 
57 See Vade-mecum for the use of the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the European Union and to the European 
Atomic Energy Community, 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/corps/index.cfm?go=vademecum.vademecum. 
58 See on the EEAS for instance J. Bátora and D. Spence (Eds.), The European External Action Service: European 
Diplomacy Post-Westphalia, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015; as well as M. Gatti, European External 
Action Service: Promoting Coherence through Autonomy and Coordination, Leiden/Boston: Brill | Nijhoff, 2016. 
 16 
British representation in the EEAS has been a key priority for the UK government. Over the 
years, however, the numbers dropped.59 Overall, the 2015 EEAS Report reveals that, of all  staff 
(officials, temporary agents, contract agents, seconded national experts) around 5.7 % has a UK 
nationality. Only Germany, Spain, Italy, France and Belgium (13.7 %) have a higher 
percentage.60 One could argue that this is exactly what the two-year negotiation period is for, 
but probably no one would like to anticipate the outcome of the negotiations by already 
replacing UK officials with staff with other nationalities. Furthermore, this would run counter 
to our earlier claim that the UK will have to live up to all EU law commitments until exit day. 
Hence, a phasing out strategy may have to be part of the withdrawal agreement, allowing for 
UK nationals to more gradually leave the EEAS. At the same time, this may be problematic as 
the question is whether, post-exit, UK staff will not have possibilities to stay. After all, Article 
27(3) TEU provides that the EEAS “shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the 
General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from 
national diplomatic services of the Member States.” A similar phrase can be found in Art. 6(2) 
of the Decision creating EEAS. It reads: “The EEAS shall comprise officials and other servants 
of the European Union, including personnel from the diplomatic services of the Member States 
appointed as temporary agents.”61 This seems to be a limitative list, which does not include 
‘staff from third countries’. 
 
The same holds true for the 139 European Union Delegations worldwide. While the Delegations 
have so far not replaced the missions of the individual Member States,62 they do represent the 
Union in all areas of foreign policy. Apart from the replacement of UK staff, the UK Embassies 
around the world will have to take over all areas and contacts the EU Delegations have invested 
in in the implementation of EU (both exclusive and shared) policy areas.  
 
3.3 Phasing-Out of Substantive External Relations Law, Policies and Case Law? 
 
Apart from freeing itself from the institutional entanglement, the UK will also have to find ways 
to deal with the fact that large parts of its external relations were defined on the basis of EU 
rules, policies and case law. Obviously, the UK will no longer be bound to any of this, but at 
the same time a clear cut may be difficult. The remark by Brexit Minister Davis that “EU law 
will be transposed into domestic law, wherever practical, on exit day” (see supra), may work 
for some of the internal rules, but is more difficult to envisage in the area of external relations 
law and policy. In a substantive manner, the UK’s external policies are to a large extent part 
                                                
59 D. Fiott, ‘“Our Man in Brussels”. The UK and the EEAS: Ambivalence and Influence’, in R. Balfour, C. Carta 
and K. Raik (Eds.), The European External Action Service and National Ministries: Convergence or Divergence?, 
London/New York: Routledge, 2015. 
60 EEAS.DG BA HR.1 - HR Policy and Coordination, May 2016, at 68; 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eeas_human_resources_report_2015.pdf 
61 Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action 
Service (2010/427/EU), OJ L 201/30, 3.8.2010. The preamble also refers to the EU Member States in provisions 
like “The staff of the EEAS should comprise a meaningful presence of nationals from all the Member States” or 
“all officials and other servants of the European Union should be able to apply for vacant posts in the EEAS.” 
62 Cf. R.A. Wessel, ‘Can the European Union Replace its Member States in International Affairs? An International 
Law Perspective’, in I. Govaere, E. Lannon, P. Van Elsuwege, S. Adam (Eds.), The European Union in the World: 
Essays in Honour of Marc Maresceau, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013, pp. 129-147. 
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and parcel of the many hard as well as soft law instruments63 that have been used in areas such 
as development policy, environmental and energy policy, the external dimension of freedom, 
security and justice, the Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy or the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. It goes beyond the scope of the present contribution to address this in 
detail, but two general questions emerge. Firstly, what are the effects on the coherence of the 
EU external policies; and secondly, in which ways will the UK be able or allowed to continue 
to be aligned to EU external policies. 
 
Obviously, the demands for consistency and coherence will no longer apply to the UK after exit 
day. At the same time, a complete change of policies that would lead to a contradiction of 
everything the EU (including the UK) developed over the past years, could certainly affect EU 
policies and could even be confusing for third parties. As the UK referendum was mainly about 
the effects of EU law on internal UK policies and preferences, drastic changes in foreign policy 
are perhaps not on the immediate agenda. 
 
A final question concerns the effects of EU external relations case-law on the UK after Brexit. 
Again, the answer seems to be quite straightforward as the UK will simply no longer be bound 
by it. At the same time, the UK has been part of the EU’s external relations structure for decades 
and the case-law has largely defined its policy options. Yet, it is difficult to find examples of a 
possible on-going influence of EU case-law on the UK post Brexit. Indeed, in most of the rules 
and Opinions of the Court in the external relations field concern the division of competences 
and this will be quite clear for the UK. Key notions as ‘pre-emption’ or ‘sincere cooperation’ 
which have extensively featured in external relations case law will no longer be a concern for 
the UK, although one may expect the UK to need some time to realise this and take the 
necessary initiatives without initiatives from the Commission of the High Representative. 
 
In conclusion, phasing-out will be difficult as the UK will remain bound until exit day and 
anticipating new arrangements seems to be excluded. Post Brexit, however, there will be 
possibilities for the UK to stay close to EU external policies and this could even be 
institutionalised – leading perhaps to a post Brexit phasing-out. All of this could become part 
of the future arrangements, which we will address in the next section. 
 
 




When this article went to print it was rather unclear what exactly the Brexit negotiations would 
cover. Even a fundamental question, whether withdrawal and future relations should be 
regulated in one agreement or two (negotiated together or in sequence) was impossible to 
answer. Quite stunningly an option of unregulated unilateral withdrawal seemed to be on the 
                                                
63 See B. Van Vooren, A Case Study of “Soft Law” in EU External Relations: The European Neighbourhood 
Policy, 34 ELRev. (2009), p. 705. 
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table. With such basic legal parameters of Brexit unclear the analysis that follows is merely an 
attempt to sketch what lays ahead and the actual finalité may be very much different from what 
we envisaged.  
 
4.2. Unilateral Brexit 
 
The easiest yet most radical scenario is UK’s departure from the European Union after two 
years of unsuccessful negotiations and a failed attempt at extension of this time framework for 
exit negotiations by the European Council. This would cut the United Kingdom almost 
completely off the European Union with an immediate effect. The UK-EU dimension of such 
a radical move goes beyond the scope of this article, however the external dimension of it needs 
to be taken on board. Should such an extreme version of Brexit materialise, the United Kingdom 
would immediately cease to be a party to all agreements between the EU and third countries in 
force on the cut-off date. Yet, at the same time, it would be formally permitted to enter into 
fully fledged negotiations of its own external relations regime and, accordingly, proceed with 
conclusion of international agreements with the outside World. From the institutional point of 
view, the United Kingdom would automatically cease to contribute and benefit from the EEAS 
and dozens of EU embassies around the globe. It would no longer be covered by EU external 
relations policies, including Common Commercial Policy or the European Neighbourhood 
Policy. Furthermore, its status as a WTO member would have to be attended to. Setting the 
political parameters of such version of Brexit aside it is rather clear that trade and economic 
consequences would be immense and would considerably undermine the performance of the 
UK’s economy. The effects would also be felt on the EU side. However, irrespective of all that, 
nothing would formally stop the United Kingdom from associating itself with EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. In general, it is not uncommon for third states to join EU statement, 
policies and even international agreements. A particularly relevant example is the alignment of 
third states with EU sanctions, something that happens quite often and obviously strengthens 
the sanction regime.64 But alignment is also possible in other areas of EU foreign and security 
policy. Thus, Declarations by the EU can be joined by third states, and international agreements 
can be concluded on for instance the participation in EU military mission.65 Dashwood even 
suggested that “with some legal tweaking (or perhaps by establishing a new ‘European Foreign, 
Security and Defence Community’), the UK should be able to retain a place at the Council 
table” in the area of CFSP.66 
 
4.2. Regulated Brexit 
 
A perhaps more realistic scenario is that the United Kingdom will depart the European Union 
on the basis of a properly negotiated withdrawal agreement. As already alluded to, the 
                                                
64 See for instance E. Hellquist, Either with us or against us? Third-country alignment with EU sanctions against 
Russia/Ukraine, 29 CRIA (2016), pp. 997-1021. 
65 The participation of third states in EU military missions is usually done on the basis of a special agreement to 
that end. See, for instance, the Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the European 
Union on the participation of the United States of America in European Union crisis management operations, OJ 
L 143/2011, p. 1. 
66 A. Dashwood, After the Deluge, 41 ELRev. (2016) pp. 469-470. 
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parameters of the latter were largely unknown when this article went to print. Bearing this in 
mind we found it necessary to draw the main alternative scenarios and their implications for 
the future participation of the United Kingdom in EU’s external activities. Although legally 
possible, the option of a single agreement governing the withdrawal and future relations has 
been rejected by the political circles. Therefore, the most realistic way in which Brexit will 
unfold are two separate treaties regulating, respectively, the terms of divorce and the afterlife. 
What remained up in the air in early 2017 was whether this duo of agreements would be 
negotiated in parallel or in sequence. From the point of view of legal certainty the latter option 
would be preferred, yet it was not clearly on the cards of the European Union. Either way the 
negotiated framework could potentially provide for a transitional period during which the 
effects of existing agreements with third countries would be preserved until further notice. This 
option, although prima facie rather plausible, has certain flaws as it proceeds on the assumption 
that there will be a consensus for such an arrangement between the EU and the UK. 
Furthermore, it does not consider the will of third countries, which are also parties to hundreds 
of agreements with the European Union. Even if one were to assume that such a scenario would 
turn into reality one has to acknowledge the complexity associated with some international 
agreements that the European Union is a party to. For instance, a decision would have to be 
made as to participation of the United Kingdom in regular updates to Association Agreements 
with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.67 Even more so, a modus operandi would have to be 
developed for participation of the United Kingdom in regular updates of the European 
Economic Area.68 That is, of course, if the United Kingdom were to remain an EEA member 
after Brexit. As noted earlier in this article, this is far from certain as of the day of withdrawal 
the United Kingdom would no longer meet the EEA eligibility criteria. Procedural and legal 
complexities would go to even a higher level if agreements existing at the time of Brexit were 
to be replaced by new treaty arrangements negotiated at that point in time or thereafter. The 
question is to what extent the United Kingdom would be permitted to participate in such 
negotiations and in what capacity. Most importantly, it is unclear whether it would be equipped 
with veto rights or the power to challenge the legality of taken decisions as a privileged 
applicant as per Article 263 TFEU. If one adds the political shenanigans connected with 
negotiations of such temporary arrangements and their implementation in practice it becomes 
clear that this scenario may not be as plausible as it seems at first sight.  
 
A more likely option is that all international treaties applicable to the European Union would 
cease to apply to the United Kingdom on the day of withdrawal. This would mean that the 
United Kingdom could proceed with negotiation of its own agreements with countries around 
the World, while the European Union would have to – in some cases –negotiate tailor-made 
protocols with existing contracting parties to reflect the fact that a state has left the Union (a 
reverse of what it regularly engages in when countries join the EU). The question is to what 
                                                
67 Association Agreement between the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and their 
Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, OJ L 161/2014, p. 3; Association Agreement 
between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one 
part, and Georgia, of the other part, OJ L 261/2014, p. 4; Association Agreement between the European Union and 
the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, 
of the other part, OJ L 260/2014, p. 4. 
68 Agreement on the European Economic Area, OJ 1994 L 1/1. 
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extent the agreement between the EU and the UK regulating relations après divorce can 
regulate participation of the United Kingdom in the EU’s external activities. In this case, much 
will depend on the will of both sides, however the existing practice can be very instructive. For 
instance, the European Economic Area, which is based on an association agreement, does not 
include provisions on the external dimension. To put it differently, its scope is limited to EU-
EFTA countries relations. The same applies to dozens of EU-Swiss Agreements regulating the 
bilateral relations. The situation is different, however, with other agreements concluded with 
EU’s immediate neighbours. To begin with, the Stabilisation and Association Agreements with 
the Western Balkans provide for co-operation between the associated states and the European 
Union in the fields covered by the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This, however, is not 
a very comprehensive legal framework as the matters in question fall under a more general 
umbrella of Political dialogue.69 A similar model has been followed in Association Agreements 
with the Mediterranean countries.70 In this respect the newly adopted Association Agreements 
with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova can be very instructive as all three comprise more 
comprehensive measures regulating alignment of these countries with EU’s foreign and security 
policy activities. It remains to be seen if provisions of that kind could find their way into the 
legal framework governing the post-Brexit relations between the European Union and the 
United Kingdom. This will depend on the political will on both sides of the negotiation table, 
in particular the question is whether the United Kingdom will wish to align itself with activities 
of the EU on the international arena. Whatever solution is opted for there will be inherent limits 
to the co-operation in this regard. One has to remember that with its departure from the EU, the 
United Kingdom will no longer be a leading actor of EU’s external relations regime but one of 
its objects, together with other neighbours of the European Union.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Given that the EU is engaged in a legal and political relationships with almost all the states in 
the world, it would be unthinkable that ties with, lets say, Vanuatu,71 would be stronger than 
with the UK. Indeed, while negotiating Britain’s exit, the future of the EU-UK relationship 
needs to be on the table. Or as phrased by Article 50 TEU, and the exit agreement should set 
out the arrangements for the Member State’s withdrawal, “taking account of the framework for 
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its future relationship with the Union”. As Article 50 leaves form and substance of the future 
framework open, various options have already been discussed in literature (and in fact some of 
these have already been taken off the table by Prime Minister May in her speech of […] January 
2017. Often, references have made to existing agreements with other non-EU states (e.g. the 
‘Turkey’ option, the ‘Norway’ option, the ‘Swiss’ option or the ‘Canada’ option).72 
 
In the contribution we focussed on the external dimension of Brexit. Our main point was that 
the UK will have to start from scratch in re-developing its international relations as large parts 
of it were regulated on the basis of EU external relations law. The existing division of 
competences as well as the principles of sincere cooperation and primacy also make it difficult 
for the UK to fully prepare future relations with third states prior to exit day. We suggested to 
think about a special transition arrangement for the UK during the 2 years of exit negotiations. 
 
This is not to say that the UK’s external relations regimes will by definition be very different 
than what it has now. In a substantive manner it will be possible to copy-paste many of the 
arrangements that are currently in EU-only agreements. At the same, there will be possibilities 
for the UK to align itself to the EU’s foreign and security policy. Both in economic and political 
terms, it will be beneficial for the UK as well as the EU when new UK policies (including 
tariffs) would stay close to the current situation. 
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